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ABSTRACT 
Under Australia’s current border control policy, ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’, migrants arriving 
irregularly by boat are transferred to offshore processing centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. On 
the basis of their poor human rights record, such centres are often criticized with reference to 
international human rights law. By conceptualizing the Australian-Nauruan arrangement as one of nodal 
governance, this article examines whether international human rights law constitutes an appropriate 
instrument to hold the involved actors responsible and accountable. The analysis of jurisdiction and 
attribution shows that it is difficult to establish responsibility on behalf of one of the involved actors. Yet 
even if responsibility can be allocated, proper human rights accountability is still impeded given the 
weak monitoring system and the non-transparent processing facilities. Establishing de jure responsibility 
in this context is thus extremely difficult, but even if one succeeds, accountability is not sufficiently 
effectuated de facto. The article concludes by questioning the actual legal value of human rights in nodal 
settings and by providing recommendations for further (extra-legal) analysis.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International human rights law purports to provide vital guarantees to all individuals within a State’s 
jurisdiction, yet it can only provide effective legal protection when proper accountability mechanism are 
in place. Academic and activist concerns about the lack of such mechanisms have surfaced in many 
contexts, amongst others in relation to Australia’s practice of establishing and maintaining asylum 
processing centres in Nauru and Papua New Guinea (‘PNG’).1 Indeed, the Australian government is 
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alleged to erect barriers to reduce transparency and to exclude asylum seekers from judicial review.
2
 At 
the same time, the human rights situation in these offshore processing centres is reportedly deplorable.
3
 
Consequently, some have called the arrangement a ‘non-solution’,4 others have labelled it a ‘Pacific 
nightmare’.5   
Calls for proper international human rights accountability in this context echo a more general 
faith in international law’s power to affect the behaviour of States and to achieve human rights 
objectives,
6
 as well as the realisation that human rights matter most for the non-citizen: they often 
constitute the only protection mechanism for those who cannot claim citizen entitlements.
7
 Indeed, 
‘human rights activists together with supportive political leadership and scholarly voices keep on calling 
for the strengthening of human rights enforcement’.8 At the same time, international human rights law 
has not remained void of criticism, amongst others in relation to its universalist claim, its effectiveness in 
holding States legally accountable and its arguably weak position to genuinely improve the situation of 
individuals.
9
 It is thus the question whether international human rights law constitutes an appropriate 
instrument to accurately induce accountability in the first place.  
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In pursuing this question, the article looks at the Australian-Pacific offshore processing 
arrangements as a case study. These arrangements were initially part of the ‘Pacific Solution’ policy 
framework (which was introduced in 2001) and are still in force under Australia’s current border control 
policy, ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’ (‘OSB’). Both frameworks entail that migrants arriving irregularly 
by boat in Australia are, without exception, transferred to remote island locations in the Pacific, namely 
Manus Island (which is part of PNG) and Nauru (a sovereign island nation).
10
 At these places, their 
potential asylum applications are registered and processed. When asylum seekers are recognized as 
refugees and are accordingly provided with refugee status, they are not resettled in Australia but in 
Nauru, PNG or Cambodia with which Australia has concluded separate resettlement agreements.
11
 
Australia is currently also exploring further resettlement agreements with other countries, including 
Kyrgyzstan.
12
 
The main focus of this article is on the processing centre in Nauru, amongst others because 
Nauru is ‘plan A when it comes to offshore processing’.13 First, the article questions how the offshore 
processing centre is set-up in terms of its governance. In answering this, theories of nodal governance 
and anchored pluralism provide useful analytical frameworks.
14
 The article subsequently looks into the 
question whether international human rights law provides an effective mechanism of responsibility and 
accountability for this type of governance.
15
 This is approached in a two-pronged way: the article first 
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examines legal responsibility under international human rights law, after which it touches upon the extent 
to which international human rights law provides a practical and functioning mechanism of 
accountability in this setting. In the conclusion, some final remarks on the actual value of human rights in 
the context of the Australian-Nauruan nodal offshore processing arrangements will be made and 
recommendations for further interdisciplinary and empirical research will be provided.  
 
2. CONTEXTUALISATION 
Throughout modern history, concerns over irregular migration have continuously triggered legal 
responses in the Australian political domain. Restrictions were already implemented in the late 1800s to 
regulate the immigration of Chinese migrants. In 1901, the Immigration Restriction Act and the White 
Australia Policy further restricted the migration of non-whites to Australia.
16
 The Revision Migration Act 
abolished some of these restrictions in 1958, with the White Australia Policy being fully abolished in 
1972. In 1992, Australia introduced a mandatory detention policy for all arrivals without valid visa. The 
Pacific Solution was introduced in 2001, followed by OSB in 2013.
17
  
The Pacific Solution was in force between 2001-2007 and applied to migrants arriving 
irregularly in Australia by boat. It was a direct response to the 2001 ‘MS Tampa incident’, in which a 
Norwegian vessel rescued 433 asylum seekers on the high sea but was denied permission to enter the 
nearest Australian port.
18
 Offshore Regional Processing Centres (‘RPCs’) in neighbouring countries were 
rapidly established for their asylum processing. These arrangements were later formalized with Nauru 
and PNG.
19
 The policy was accompanied by broader border protection measures and relied heavily on 
deterrence rationales and punitive detention in jail-like establishments.
20
 It was embedded in a wider 
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Bowling and Sheptycki, ‘Global Policing, Mobility and Social Control’ in Pickering and Ham (eds), The Routledge 
Handbook on Crime and International Migration, (2014) 57 at 68; Hyndman and Mountz, ‘Another Brick in the 
Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe’ (2008) 43 Government and 
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discussion on the protection and securitisation of the nation state, in which scapegoating discourse was 
utilized to frame migrants arriving irregularly by boat as illegals, border threats, queue jumpers and 
potential criminals.
21
 
The Pacific Solution was abolished in 2007 but offshore processing was reintroduced by the 
Gillard government in 2012 and was continued under the Rudd government in 2013. In September 2013, 
the newly elected Coalition government headed by Prime Minister Tony Abbott
22
 continued with 
offshore processing under the heading of a new policy framework, OSB. It entails a more militarized 
deterrence policy geared at migrants arriving irregularly by boat and is headed by a senior military 
commander of three star ranking.
23
 The policy militarized maritime patrols, reintroduced a tow-back 
policy and is accompanied by significant amounts of secrecy, which is justified through discourse 
emphasising both that these procedures save lives by putting an absolute stop to the drowning of 
irregular migrants and that they are effective in combatting the businesses and practices of human 
smugglers.
24
 It consequently holds that migrants arriving by boat irregularly, even when granted refugee 
status, will never be resettled in Australia: ‘they will not make Australia home’ has become a key slogan 
of the operation.
25
 In a similar vein as the Pacific Solution, OSB focuses on deterrence and border 
protection by simultaneously fostering public concern and leaving little room for alternative discourses.
26
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Cooperation or Passing the Buck?’ (2014) 1 Cultural Encounters, Conflicts, and Resolutions 1. 
24
 Van Berlo, supra n. 2; Grewcock, supra n 10; Klein, ‘Assessing Australia’s Push Back the Boast Policy Under 
International Law: Legality and Accountability for Maritime Interceptions of Irregular Migrants’ (2015) 15 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 414; Schloenhardt and Craig, ‘‘Turning Back the Boats’: Australia’s 
Interdiction of Irregular Migrants at Sea’ (2015) 27 International Journal of Refugee Law 536. 
25
 Laughland, ‘Australian Government Targets Asylum Seekers with Graphic Campaign’, Guardian, 11 February 
2014, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/11/government-launches-new-graphic-campaign-to-
deter-asylum-seekers [last accessed 11 February 2016]; Van Berlo, ‘Stonewalling Asylum Seekers in the Pacific’, 
Blog: Leiden Law Blog,  17 May 2014, available at: leidenlawblog.nl/articles/stonewalling-asylum-seekers-in-the-
pacific [last accessed 11 February 2016]. 
26
 Van Berlo, supra n 2; Welch, supra n 1. 
6 
 
 The offshore processing arrangements should be understood against the geographical 
particularities of the Australian-Pacific region: being a relatively wealthy island nation, the Australian 
government’s border security ideals are unique in that they could be realized – thus, ‘the dream of total 
deterrence expressed by “stop the boats” can come true’.27 This sense of uniqueness is widely shared: 
whilst offshore processing has also occurred to varying extents elsewhere, including in Europe
28
 and the 
United States,
29
 politicians in a variety of countries frequently refer to the Australian-Pacific 
arrangements as highly successful and admirable.
30
 Furthermore, Australia is the hegemonic power in the 
rather isolated Pacific region: Nauru and PNG used to be under the direct influence and control of 
Australia and are nowadays still heavily dependent on Australian financial aid and development 
funding.
31
 This is particularly true in the case of Nauru: having approximately 10.000 inhabitants and 
comprising approximately 21 square kilometres, it is the smallest sovereign nation in the Pacific (and the 
smallest country in the world after Vatican City and Monaco) with little stability or economic activity – 
in fact, it stood at the verge of bankruptcy at the beginning of the 2000s.
32
 The Nauruan political system 
is too unstable, inexperienced and polarized to fundamentally alter this and to have a long-term 
stabilizing impact on the economy.
33
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 Chambers, supra n 23, at 407. 
28
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Human Security 165. 
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lot of concerns and criticisms regarding offshore processing have also been raised by a variety of stakeholders, 
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Islands Regional Integration and Governance, (2005) 89; Grewcock, supra n 10; Narayanasamy et al., supra n 1. 
32
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33
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3. NODAL GOVERNANCE AND ANCHORED PLURALISM IN THE AUSTRALIAN-
NAURUAN OFFSHORE PROCESSING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
A. Nodal Governance 
Safekeeping is often regarded as a core task of nation states: throughout the twentieth century, systems of 
security such as criminal justice and border control have been firmly based in state sovereignty.
34
 This is 
not to say that modern history has not experienced outsourcing in the security branch – on the contrary, 
fragmentation and pluralisation have frequently featured in the criminal justice systems of predominantly 
Anglo-Saxon countries.
35
 We have thus, for example, witnessed a ‘return’ to privatization.36  
Such outsourcing developments can be interpreted from the perspective of ‘nodal governance’, 
according to which a plurality of actors (or ‘nodes’) are involved in contemporary modalities of 
governance.
37
 The nodes are interconnected both formally and informally, act simultaneously through a 
variety of mechanisms and processes and are capable of adapting rapidly to changing circumstances.
38
 
All nodes exhibit four characteristics of governance: (i) mentalities (that is, a cultural narrative guiding 
the thinking and acting of the node vis-à-vis the governance matter), (ii) technologies (methods to exert 
control and pursue goals), (iii) resources (providing for the node’s operation, including financial 
resources and network connections) and (iv) an institutional structure (to mobilize and effectuate 
technologies, resources and mentalities).
39
 The more resources an institutional node has, the more likely 
it is that it can effectively deploy its technologies to reach its goals as defined by its mentality: ‘[i]n cases 
where there are competing preferences, bargaining power counts’.40 
 Given their diverging mentalities, technologies and resources, the actors in the nodal governance 
field continuously cooperate, conflict and contest in different ways and configurations.
41
 The emphasis in 
the nodal governance approach is, however, on the networks through which such cooperation, conflict 
                                                          
34
 Van Berlo, ‘The Crimmigrant as Captive and Commodity: The Rise of Privatised and Offshore Detention from a 
Crimmigration Perspective’ (2015) 40(4) JASON Magazine 126 at 127; Shearing and Wood, supra n 14 at 401. 
35
 Feeley, ‘The Unconvincing Case Against Private Prisons’ (2014) 89 Indiana Law Journal 1401; Jones, and 
Newburn, ‘The Transformation of Policing? Understanding Current Trends in Policing Systems’ (2002) 42 British 
Journal of Criminology 129; Zedner, ‘Policing Before and After the Police: The Historical Antecedents of 
Contemporary Crime Control’ (2005) 46 British Journal of Criminology 78. 
36
 Aiken, Lyon and Thorburn, ‘Introduction: ‘Crimmigration, Surveillance and Security Threats’ (2014) 40 Queen’s 
Law Journal i; Aman, ‘Privatisation, Prisons, Democracy and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of 
Administrative Law’ in De Feyter and Gómez Isa (eds), Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of 
Globalisation, (2005) 91; Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with Human Rights (2011) at 22–3; Zedner, 
supra n 35. 
37
 Burris, Drahos and Shearing, supra n 14. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid; Burris, ‘Governance, Microgovernance and Health’ (2004) 77 Temple Law Review 335. 
40
 Wood and Shearing, supra n 14 at 12. 
41
 Burris, Drahos and Shearing, supra n 14; Shearing and Wood, supra n 14; Wood and Shearing, supra n 14. 
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and contestation materializes rather than on the actors themselves.
42
 Power and control are thus 
everywhere: not with a particular node but with the network.
43
  
According to various scholars, the government should therefore be understood as only one of 
many actors in a fragmented field.
44
 The work of Lahav and Guiraudon in the field of migration control 
constitutes a good example of how such reality can be conceived of: they identify the devolution of 
decision-making and the shifting of control ‘upwards’, ‘downwards’ and ‘outwards’ to 
intergovernmental fora, local authorities and non-state actors.
45
 As a consequence, analysis of 
contemporary governance structures requires a nodal perspective that goes beyond the notions of ‘the 
public-private divide’ and ‘top-down governance’.46 
 
B. Anchored Pluralism 
Nodal governance theory has attracted criticism predominantly from ‘anchored pluralism’ scholars.47 
They emphasise that the state’s role in governance is still (and should remain) distinctive.48 If this would 
not be the case, the location of responsibility for monitoring and regulating the governance network 
would become troublesome, which in turn is problematic as it would leave vulnerable communities with 
little protection and the governance field with little direction.
49
 Thus, the state’s role remains pivotal: its 
centralized legal order should license the functioning of other autonomous localities (and the rules that 
they use).
50
  
Although often presented as an alternative perspective,
51
 the concept of anchored pluralism 
should, however, not be regarded as incompatible with nodal governance. Whilst it fundamentally 
disagrees with the position of the state as ‘just a node’, it nevertheless agrees that the number of actors 
involved – and their interrelationships – have mushroomed in contemporary security governance. The 
two can thus be united in a conception of nodal governance with direction: although many actors with 
their own mentalities, technologies, resources and institutional structures are involved in governance, the 
boundaries within which they are allowed to roam should arguably be set and supervised by the state 
                                                          
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Wood and Shearing, supra n 14. 
44
 Burris, supra n 39; Shearing and Wood, supra n 14 at 401; Shearing, ‘Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge 
Private Governments’ in Wood and Dupont (eds), Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security, (2006) 11 
at 26–8. 
45
 Guiraudon and Lahav, ‘A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate The Case of Migration Control’ (2000) 33 
Comparative political studies 163; Lahav, ‘Immigration and the State: The Devolution and Privatisation of 
Immigration Control in the EU’ (1998) 24 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 675. 
46
 Burris, supra n 39; Shearing and Wood, supra n 14; Van Berlo, supra n 34. 
47
 Boutellier and Van Steden, ‘Governing Nodal Governance: The ‘anchoring’ of Local Security Networks’ in 
Crawford (ed), International and Comparative Criminal Justice and Urban Governance, (2011) 461; Loader and 
Walker, ‘State of Denial?: Rethinking the Governance of Security’ (2004) 6 Punishment & Society 221. 
48
 Boutellier and van Steden, supra n 47 at 466. 
49
 Ibid; Loader and Walker, ‘Necessary Virtues: The Legitimate Place of the State in the Production of Security’ in 
Wood and Dupont (eds), Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security, (2006) 165. 
50
 Boutellier and van Steden, supra n 47 at 467. 
51
 White, supra n 14 at 93. 
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through binding regulations, guidelines and monitoring. The state has significant resources and 
technologies at its disposal, amongst which the power to make laws and public policies, and as such 
holds a supreme power to steer the arrangements. Whilst each of the other nodes may have its own 
separate goals, for example making profit or providing altruistic support, these should be anchored in, 
compatible with, and circumscribed by, the State’s direction. If nodes fail to comply, States may sanction 
them in a variety of ways – including by their exclusion from the governance field. That is not to say that 
States per definition heavily rely on this power, nor that they are eager to use it under all circumstances – 
rather, States can (and, from a normative perspective, arguably should) provide anchoring and 
monitoring to safeguard the public nature of security. The analysis below will assess to what extent this 
is the case in the Australian-Nauruan arrangements. 
 
C. The Australian-Pacific Arrangements: Mapping the Nodal Field 
The involved actors in the RPC are outlined below and schematically depicted in Figure 1. Whilst one 
may be puzzled by the complex and potentially confusing schematic depiction at first, it accurately 
reflects the bewildering nature of the governance arrangements.  
 
(i) The Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Nauruan Government 
According to the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection (‘DIBP’), the RPC is a 
central element of the Australian government’s effort to protect the border, although it is not run by 
Australia.
52
 This is aptly summarized by Australia’s former Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection Scott Morrison during a press conference, where he notes that ‘[e]verything that is done on 
Nauru is done under Nauruan law under the auspices of the Nauruan Government and there is a 
significant amount of support which is provided by the Australian Government to ensure the proper 
running of those facilities’.53 This message is regularly repeated by the Australian government.54 
As agreed upon via a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’), the Government of Nauru 
formally runs and operates the centres, hosts transferees and provides them with visas, assesses asylum 
                                                          
52
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53
 DIBP, ‘Transcript: Press Conference – Operation Sovereign Borders Update’, 1 November 2013, available at: 
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54
 For example, Minister Morrison likewise states that ‘the more [service providers] can just get on with their 
business of providing care and support in those places, to work with the local host government in terms of 
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claims and arranges resettlement, under Nauruan law, with support from the Australian government.
55
 To 
this end, the Nauruan Government appoints Operational Managers and Deputy Operational Managers to 
manage operations at the RPC.
56
 This enables the Government of Nauru to be ‘on top of operational 
issues’.57 
Pursuant to the Australian-Nauruan agreement, the DIBP and its contracted service providers 
provide to Nauru advice and support services.
58
 The Australian government provided specific expertise 
on a variety of administration functions (such as community liaison, refugee status determination and 
legislation and policy development).
59
 In addition, the DIBP deploys some members of its departmental 
staff at the RPC to support the Nauruan Operational Managers and to administer service contracts, 
coordinate infrastructure and foster community liaison.
60
 The Senior position in this regard is the 
Assistant Secretary, Nauru Operations.
61
 In March 2015, the number of identified DIBP employees on 
Nauru was 20.
62
  
 There is a joint working group (chaired by the Nauruan government) to discuss operational issues 
(including visas, staffing and events) and a Joint Advisory Committee (‘JAC’) to oversee operational 
matters at a strategic level. A Joint Ministerial Forum oversees the implementation of the Australian-
Nauruan regional partnership. In addition, the Nauru Settlement Working Group is an open-
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57
 Nauru Government Information Office, ‘No Change to RPC Plans’, Nauru Bulletin, 26 July 2013, available at: 
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communications forum between the Nauruan and Australian Governments to discuss the potential effects 
of refugee settlement on the local Nauruan community.
63
  
 It should be noted, however, that in particular the Australian discourse on the RPCs is at best 
confusing, at worst somewhat schizophrenic. The Australian Government has sometimes acknowledged 
its responsibility for the RPCs whilst it at other times has argued that they are matters of Nauru.
64
 In 
essence, the picture painted by the Australian Government is one in which Nauru has the ultimate 
authority but Australia has a de facto large influence and a significant discretionary decision making 
space.
65
 
 
(ii) Construction services: The Australian Defence Force and Canstruct 
In August and September 2012, the Australian Defence Force built temporary accommodation, sanitation 
facilities, kitchen facilities and dining and recreational spaces mostly in (military) tents and marquees.
66
 
Canstruct, a construction service provider, was contracted in November 2012 to construct permanent 
facilities and staff accommodation.
67
 On its website, it states that the ‘multitude of stakeholders’ was one 
of the major challenges of the project.
68
 Now that the RPC is completed, Canstruct ‘has moved on to 
various infrastructure assets on Nauru’.69 
 
(iii) Service providers for garrison, welfare, security and health services 
A number of other service providers contracted by the DIBP have been, and are, operative in the RPC. In 
September 2012, Transfield Services, the Salvation Army and IHMS were engaged to provide 
respectively garrison, welfare and health services.
70
 Transfield Services is the lead contractor: thus, ‘there 
can be no doubt that without Transfield the operation of the [RPC] would be impossible’.71 According to 
Transfield Services itself, it has ‘methodically developed the infrastructure, systems and processes that 
                                                          
63
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64
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now apply at the offshore processing centre’.72 It subcontracted security services to Wilson Security, 
although it holds responsibility for the subcontractor’s actions and the DIBP is therefore unable to deal 
directly with Wilson Security on a formal basis.
73
  
In February 2014, the Salvation Army’s role in providing welfare services was transferred to 
Transfield Services (welfare for single adult males) and Save the Children Australia (welfare for single 
adult females, families, children and couples without children).
74
 After having won a tender, Transfield 
Services took over all welfare services of Save the Children in November 2015.
75
 At the same time, 
Transfield Services changed its name to Broadspectrum Ltd – allegedly because its parent company tries 
to distance itself from allegations of abuse and contract controversies over the RPCs in Nauru and 
PNG.
76
 It now provides transferee services, management and maintenance of assets and the processing 
site, transport and escort, security services, catering, personnel accommodation, governance, logistics 
and welfare services.
77
 As the lead private actor, it  
 
makes decisions about detainee welfare, placement, movement, communication, accommodation, 
food, clothing, water, security and environment on a daily basis. ‘….’ Transfield’s responsibility 
under the contracts include indemnifying the [DIBP] for any personal injury, disease, illness or 
death or any person, reduced proportionately to the extent that any act or omission involved 
fault on the part of the [DIBP].
78
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The service providers discuss issues of care and well-being with the Nauruan Operational Managers in a 
number of ‘stakeholder forums’, which is supported by the DIBP.79 They also discuss with both the 
Nauruan Government and the DIBP how to strengthen the personal safety and privacy of transferees.
80
 In 
addition, the DIBP facilitates information sessions, review meetings and joint service provider forums to 
encourage information sharing, cooperation and collaboration.
81
 Service providers have to adhere to 
Nauruan standards, but if such standards do not exist, contracts may require providers to adhere to 
Australian standards in delivering services.
82
  
Increasingly, Nauruans are employed at the Centre and goods and services are as far as possible 
sourced from Nauruan companies.
83
 Transfield Services/Broadspectrum Ltd. and Wilson Security are 
even required to employ a minimum number of local Nauruan staff and sub-contractors.
84
 Consequently, 
Wilson Security subcontracts part of its responsibilities to the local security providers Sterling Security 
and Protective Security Services.
85
 Transfield/Broadspectrum does so to Sterling Security, Rainbow 
Enterprise, Capelle & Partner, One-4-One Car Rentals, Nauru Rehabilitation Corporation, Ronphos, 
Aiwo Town Ace Petrol Station, Oden Aiwo Hotel, Dei-Naoero Cleaners, Nauru Utilities Corporation, 
Republic of Nauru Hospital, Eigigu Holding Corporation, Menen Hotel Nauru and Our Airline.
86
 Some 
of these (for example Eigigu Holding Corporation) are owned by the Government of Nauru.
87
 The DIBP 
and service providers are working on developing strategies to foster the capacity of Nauruan staff 
members, for example by expanding Transfield’s/Broadspectrum’s formal training opportunities.88  
It is seemingly impossible to denote all subcontractors that are currently engaged in the RPC, as 
both the public authorities and the private contractors provide little clarity in relation to (the extent of) 
subcontracting and physical access to the RPC is lacking.
89
 Whilst Figure 1 attempts to provide an 
overview of the involved actors as comprehensive as possible, it cannot be ruled out that additional 
                                                          
79
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subcontractors are also engaged. This constitutes however no major obstacle for purposes of the present 
article’s argument. In fact, the fluctuating and obfuscated practice of subcontracting relates closely to the 
nodal governance model as it stresses the hybrid nature of governance and the limited relevance of 
isolating individual actors from the governance network for analytical purposes.  
 
(iv) Health care: IHMS and the Republic of Nauru Hospital 
As outlined above, IHMS is the contracted health care provider, although it sub-contracts torture and 
trauma counselling to Overseas Services to Survivors of Torture and Trauma (‘OSSTT’).90 Health care is 
provided for in the RPC in general practitioner, nursing and mental health care clinics. The care provided 
for is supposed to be consistent with Australian health standards.
91
 An emergency physician and after-
hours medical staffing are also present, supplemented by ‘visiting specialists, other health practitioners, a 
tele-health service and medical transfers when required’.92 Medical transfers are, however, reduced as 
health services on Nauru are expanded at the Republic of Nauru Hospital.
93
 In terms of mental health, 
teams of mental health nurses, psychologists and visiting consultant psychiatrists are present.
94
 In the 
event of an alleged assault, IHMS has to offer the alleged victim(s) immediate and continuous health 
care.
95
 Child safety concerns are reported to the Child Safeguarding and Protection Manager of Safe the 
Children.
96
 All personnel employed in the RPC in Nauru has to sign a mandatory ‘working with children 
code of conduct’.97 
 
(v) Policing and incidents: The Nauru Police Force and the Australian Federal Police 
The Nauru Police Force has to undertake community policing patrols to the RPC.
98
 In addition, the 
Nauru Police Force has two officers permanently deployed at the RPC to cooperate with service 
providers for investigation purposes.
99
 The Australian Federal Police advices the Nauru Police Force on 
the coordination of policing at the RPC and on investigation training.
100
  
The DIBP cooperates with the Nauru Police Force, as well as with the Nauruan Operational 
Managers and the service delivery staff to handle incidents in the RPC.
101
 To this end, incident 
management arrangements and management protocols exist, and the DIBP has  
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formally communicated to all service providers its expectations in relation to compliance with 
contractual obligations; the personal safety and privacy of transferees; information security and 
the handling of personal information; the management of the behaviour of company personnel; 
and strengthened child protection standards.
102
 
 
In terms of emergency management procedures and protocols, the Australian Federal Police advices both 
the DIBP and the Nauruan Government.
103
 Service providers must report incidents to the Operational 
Managers as well as the DIBP.
104
 According to the DIBP, any allegation of assault is referred and 
reported to the Nauru Police Force. If appropriate, prosecution is commenced by the Nauruan 
authorities.
105
 When a person under 18 is reportedly harmed, this is also reported to the Nauru 
Department of Youth and Community.
106
 However, ‘[a]lleged misconduct by service provider staff, 
where not criminal in nature, is referred to the relevant service provider to investigate’.107  
 
(vi) Community liaison and resettlement 
The Government of Nauru has installed a Community Liaison Officer network to support transferees 
who participate in Open Centre arrangements. Connect Settlement Services, an Australian consortium of 
Adult Multicultural Education Service and the Multicultural Development Association, provides refugee 
settlement services.
108
 The DIBP and the Nauruan Police Force are developing proposals to include 
refugees resettled in Nauru in law enforcement roles and community policing functions.
109
 In assisting 
transferee and refugee children, the DIBP engages with the Queensland Catholic Education Commission 
and the Brisbane Catholic Education (and in consultation with the Nauru Department of Education) to 
provide support to the education system of Nauru.
110
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*Figure 1: Governance in the Nauru RPC 
 
As the complexity of Figure 1 depicts, the Australian-Nauruan arrangements can thus be regarded as 
combining nodal governance and anchored pluralism – at least to a certain degree. Through the 
networked interaction between a variety of cooperating, contesting and conflicting actors, governance 
and power materialize. At the same time, the Nauruan and Australian governments have implemented a 
number of anchoring points including contractual stipulations, formal and informal communications, 
incident management arrangements and management protocols, daily and weekly meetings, minimum 
standards for service providers, codes of conduct, joint committees and working groups. Through these 
anchoring mechanisms, they curtail – at least on paper – ‘the unfettered “invisible hand” of capitalist 
economies’.111  
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4. HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NAURU 
REGIONAL PROCESSING CENTRE 
A nodal set-up is not per definition problematic under international law: there are no international legal 
norms directly prescribing, endorsing, or prohibiting the trend towards nodal governance of State 
services, tasks and functions.
112
 Nevertheless, nodal governance in the immigration realm seems to raise 
a plurality of legal accountability questions which are only addressed since ‘relatively recently’.113 
Effective legal human rights protection depends on both responsibility and accountability. They 
are key concepts of a democratic and legitimate government: without them, democracy remains a ‘paper 
procedure’.114 Both are connected through a two-step process: first, an actor can be responsible for 
certain legal obligations, which can be identified and delineated by looking at the relevant legal 
instrument, whilst second, the actor can be held accountable for the way in which it exercises its 
responsibilities. Such accountability exists of both ‘answerability’ and ‘enforcement’.115 There thus needs 
to be ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences’.116 
 
A. Responsibility 
Three types of actors are involved in the RPC: territorial (Nauruan) state actors, extraterritorial 
(Australian) state actors and private actors. For international human rights responsibility to be triggered, 
an alleged abuse must be a breach of one of these actors’ international obligations (for which the notion 
of jurisdiction provides guidance) and must be attributable to that actor.
117
 Both will be assessed below 
for each of the three types of actors involved.   
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(i) Responsibility for obligations under international human rights law: jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction of Nauru 
Under international human rights law, States are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of those 
‘within their jurisdiction’.118 Many international human rights frameworks are indeed limited in their 
scope of application to the jurisdiction of a State,
119
 which in turn is associated with the territory ‘as the 
primary realm of state power’.120 The main presumption for jurisdiction is thus territoriality.121 It has 
traditionally been, and still remains, the cornerstone of international human rights protection owed by a 
State, and it has therefore become reflexive to limit human rights obligations to a State’s territorial 
borders.
122
 As Subedi puts it, ‘[n]o matter how much the world has changed since the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the fact remains that the primary responsibility of 
protecting the rights of individuals residing within a state rests with that state’.123 
Jurisdiction on behalf of Nauru as the territorial State is consequently presumed to exist. To 
speak with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), ‘jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised 
normally throughout the state’s territory. This presumption may be limited in exceptional circumstances 
[only], particularly where a state is prevented from exercising its authority in part of its territory’.124 In 
this case, such exceptional circumstances are not present: the Nauruan Government knowingly and 
wilfully entered into an MoU, provides special visas to asylum seekers, processes asylum claims under 
Nauruan law, resettles refugees and is actively engaged in the RPC via various state actors, including its 
(Deputy) Operational Managers and the Nauruan Police Force. Nothing indicates that Nauru is 
unwillingly prevented from exercising its authority in the RPC: the RPC cannot be regarded as occupied 
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by a foreign power and Nauru exercises a certain degree of sovereign control over the asylum seekers 
processed in the RPC. As such, Nauru is bound to respect, protect and fulfil its human rights obligations 
and is responsible for potential human rights violations that it commits in the RPC as part of its 
territory.
125
  
 
Jurisdiction of Australia 
Assessing whether Australia has human rights obligations in the Nauru RPC likewise requires an 
evaluation of its jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction, however, appears more problematic as human rights 
obligations beyond the territory of a State were for a long time regarded as ‘non-existent or minimalistic 
at best’.126 As Gammeltoft-Hansen points out, a clash may be observed in this respect between the sollen 
and the sein of human rights law: whilst the idea of universality and inalienable protection is inherent to 
international human rights norms, they are simultaneously put forward as positive law in the form of 
international covenants and treaties based on the primacy of territorial jurisdiction.
127
 Amongst others, 
this discrepancy has caused the territorial paradigm to be increasingly questioned, in particular because 
States nowadays have the ability to impact upon human rights far beyond their own borders.
128
  
In recent case law and scholarship, the notion of ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ has gained 
importance. It entails that a state also carries responsibility for human rights obligations beyond its 
sovereign territory. Treaty monitoring bodies indeed increasingly clarify that a State’s jurisdiction under 
international human rights law can and does extend beyond its sovereign borders.
129
 Whilst for some 
such jurisdiction remains the exception to the norm,
130
 others have argued that it is more than 
exceptional.
131
   
In examining this topic, one cannot ignore the gist of the  ECtHR’s case law as it is arguably the 
strongest human rights protection mechanism at the international level and has had a significant 
influence on the conceptualisation of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
132
 The ECtHR has primarily 
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acknowledged extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases where states exercised authority and control over a 
person (‘personal jurisdiction’) or where they had effective control of an area (‘spatial jurisdiction’).133 
Fulfilling the legal thresholds of these tests has proven difficult in various cases, most notoriously in the 
much criticized Bankovic decision where the ECtHR declared that the bombing of the Radio Televizije 
Srbije building in Belgrade during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 fell outside the jurisdictional scope of the 
respondent NATO member states.
134
 The restrictive and problematic implications of this judgment were 
later revisited (and arguably repaired) by the Court in Al-Skeini,
135
 in which it introduced a third hybrid 
way (in addition to the personal jurisdiction and spatial jurisdiction) to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: that of exercising ‘military authority pursuant to the assumption of public functions in a 
foreign territory’.136  
For Australia, the ECtHR’s case law is – although of relevance – not authoritative. Arguments 
that Australia’s domestic laws should be interpreted consistently with European law have not remained 
uncontroversial and have been labelled as ‘heretical’.137 At the same time, the significant influence of the 
ECtHR on the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot go unnoticed, in particular because we 
currently witness a ‘shift in the conceptualization of international human rights towards a holistic rights 
framework, emphasizing the universality, interdependence, ‘indivisibility’ and justiciability of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural human rights’.138 Recent literature on the matter has argued for a 
‘normative synergy amongst human rights treaties’: a collapse of normative boundaries that traditionally 
divided the human rights treaties and their monitoring bodies.
139
 Thus, the various human rights 
monitoring bodies should ‘consider their six treaties as interconnected parts of a single human rights 
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“constitution” and thereby consider themselves as partner chambers within a consolidating supervisory 
institution’.140 From this perspective, the ECtHR’s lines of reasoning can (and does) significantly 
influence the global perception of human rights concepts. It is for this reason that it will occasionally be 
referred to in the remainder of this article. 
Discussions on extraterritorial jurisdiction have also featured in the case law of amongst others 
the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), which monitors the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Australia is party. In interpreting the ICCPR’s jurisdictional provision 
as codified in Article 2(1), the HRC has applied an expansive approach to also include extraterritorial 
responsibility.
141
 It mentioned such jurisdiction for example explicitly in its General Comment 31 of 
2004.
142
 The HRC acknowledged extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases where State agents had committed 
human rights violations on the territory of another State (personal jurisdiction),
143
 where there was 
effective control of an area (spatial jurisdiction),
144
 and where the applicant was residing abroad.
145
 The 
HRC has thus to a large extent applied a similar approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction as the ECtHR – a 
development which is likely welcomed by advocates of a normative synergy amongst human rights 
treaties.
146
 In fact, the HRC has been argued to be a frontrunner in advocating such a broad conception of 
jurisdictional applicability.
147
  
In general, there appears to be agreement on the spatial and personal tests for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction between the various international supervisory bodies, although there is no agreement on the 
applicability of human rights law to other types of extraterritorial behaviour.
148
 Nonetheless, these tests 
remain premised on significant evidentiary thresholds which in each alleged instance of extraterritorial 
violation need to be fulfilled.
149
 Indeed, for jurisdiction to be extended extraterritorially, an additional 
step of authority or control over the victim or geographical location is needed, which Gammeltoft-
Hansen has called the ‘sovereignty threshold’.150 Extraterritorial jurisdiction hence remains problematic 
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in light of this threshold – and, arguably, in light of the confusing and inconsistent case law on the 
matter.
151
  
Whether Australia has extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Nauru RPC consequently depends on 
one’s view of Australia’s control over the location and/or the people situated there – yet these views tend 
to differ. A number of commentators argue that Australia’s extraterritorial jurisdiction is triggered in the 
Nauru RPC. Although weighing different facts in testing the level of personal and/or spatial control, 
these commentators maintain that Australia’s extraterritorial jurisdiction is triggered either because it has 
effective control over the asylum seekers in the RPC or because it has a significant amount of (financial, 
practical and otherwise) influence and control over the activities undertaken by other actors and as such 
has effective control over the RPC.
152
 In discussing the comparable case of the PNG agreement, Taylor 
on the other hand seems to have more problems with asserting that Australia has extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: she first argues that the spatial test is not fulfilled as Australia does not have effective 
control over PNG’s territory (or a part of it) and subsequently outlines that the personal test is neither 
fulfilled because PNG is the detaining State and that  
 
[a]t the present stage of development of international jurisprudence, it seems highly unlikely that 
an individual would be regarded as being subject to the effective control of a state unless an 
agent of that state is exercising some kind of coercive power over that person […]. [T]here is no 
evidence to suggest that […] Australian officials are actually exercising coercive power over 
those asylum seekers.
153
  
 
Support for this assertion can be found in Gammeltoft-Hansen’s work, who states that the threshold for 
personal jurisdiction has so far merely been reached in cases where full physical control was involved.
154
 
This is, in this case, at least questionable given that the Nauruan government decided in October 2015 to 
change the nature of the RPC to an open centre, with detention thereby having ‘ended’.155  
This lacking consensus is also a result of the RPC’s nodal set-up: because each involved actor 
has a continuously fluctuating power and influence and because service-providing actors are regularly 
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replaced, the governance nature of the RPC as well as the levels of actual control of the various actors are 
constantly changing. For example, Nauru introduced Operational Managers in the RPC in 2014,
156
 which 
– at least in theory – provides the Nauruan Government with better technologies to influence the 
governance field and with a larger extent of control. Another example is the fluctuating involvement of 
private actors, which at some stages have a significant influence and at other stages a more modest one. 
Transfield/Broadspectrum, for example, has gained in control and importance over the past years as it is 
gradually given more responsibility for providing a host of services.
157
 Whilst the effective control 
requirement necessitates a factual assessment, the facts and power relations thus continuously change, 
thereby influencing the level of control of the various actors involved in unpredictable and often 
indiscernible ways. Control rests primarily with the network, not so much with a single actor – at least 
not all the time. Determining that an actor has effective control today does, therefore, not mean that it has 
such effective control tomorrow: in the face of a concrete alleged human rights abuse, this question needs 
to be constantly re-assessed on the basis of the evolving circumstances and the ever-changing power 
structure of the nodal network. Den Heijer aptly summarizes that the multitude of actors involved in the 
Nauru RPC, as well as the complex legal arrangements, make it difficult to give a final answer: whether 
the sovereignty threshold is met depends on the specific complaint and the particular involvement of the 
various actors.
158
 At the same time, the governance arrangements and the Nauru RPC are neither very 
transparent nor accessible as will be further outlined below. This hampers the factual assessment of 
effective control that is needed to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction in the face of a concrete allegation 
of a human rights abuse.  
A potential way to get around these problems is to look at case law on extradition, where various 
monitoring bodies including the HRC and the ECtHR have noted that a State may be in violation of its 
obligations if it extradites an individual to a State where his or her rights are likely to be violated.
159
 
Nevertheless, these cases concerned scenarios in which the person to be extradited faced a real risk of 
being tortured or being inhumanely or degradingly treated, which are rather clear potential future 
violations of human rights. In the present case, this is different: given the lack of transparency and the 
fact that Australia has sought assurances and monitors the facilities, it is hardly possible to establish a 
priori whether and to what extent a transferred migrant will face a violation of his or her rights at the 
Nauru RPC. This is particularly the case now that the RPC has been transformed into an open-centre 
arrangement, thereby ending the practice of indiscriminate and indefinite mandatory detention which 
before its abolition could arguably be construed as a foreseeable violation of the human right to liberty 
and the prohibition of arbitrary detention. Whilst there may be some indications that the RPC’s 
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conditions are not optimal, under the open-centre arrangements it is hence not clear that a violation of for 
example the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment will occur and is 
foreseeable, which depends on a factual assessment and the level and credibility of assurances attained. 
Australia argues that the implemented monitoring mechanisms prevent such violations, and given that 
first-hand and real-time information on the present human rights situation in the Nauru RPC remains 
incidental and scarce, it is difficult to reject such a proposition in the context of potential future 
violations. It would consequently be too easy to reject Australia’s assurances right away, yet at the same 
time it is too difficult to irrefutably prove them wrong.  
 
The private actors 
In the Westphalian system, international human rights law was particularly created and modelled to 
circumscribe the extent and use of public power by sovereign States.
160
 Only States can thus be the 
respondent to complaints under human rights treaties that provide for a complaint mechanism.
161
  
Trends of nodal governance challenge this traditional view because non-State actors increasingly 
engage as governance actors in human rights-related conduct.
162
 Multinational corporations involved in 
such arrangements often have a far larger economic power than some sovereign States (including Nauru) 
which seems an appropriate reason to impose human rights duties on corporations.
163
 The option of 
extending human rights duties horizontally to private actors is for some consequently a promising 
strategy,
164
 yet such developments have not changed the state-centric approach from being the dominant 
foundation of positive international human rights law.
165
 To some extent, norms are developed by 
international and regional organisations, the corporate world itself and civil society in order to enhance 
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corporate social responsibility.
166
 However, these norms largely constitute soft law and embody legal 
aspirations and moral values rather than binding norms of hard law.
167
  
Thus, ‘as yet there does not appear to be an international consensus on the place of businesses 
and other nonstate actors in the international legal order’.168 Put more sceptically, ‘too many of them 
currently escape the net’.169 For purposes of legal accountability under positive international human 
rights law, it is therefore not needed to further examine the human rights responsibility of 
Transfield/Broadspectrum, Wilson Security, Save the Children Australia, Canstruct and the other 
(sub)contractors. Whilst maybe desirable, as of yet they have no legally binding international human 
rights obligations for which they can be held accountable on the legal level. At most, they may have 
contractual obligations which can include certain duties to uphold human rights standards, yet such 
obligations are not part of the body of international law.  
 
(ii) Responsibility for conduct: attribution, derived responsibility and positive obligations 
Apart from jurisdiction, international responsibility on behalf of a State can only be established when the 
conduct allegedly constituting an abuse of human rights can be seen as conduct of that State. To 
approach this issue in the context of the Nauru RPC, three distinct (yet complementary) mechanisms will 
be discussed: that of attribution, derived responsibility and positive obligations.
170
 
 
Attribution 
Rules of attribution are central to international law, because sovereign states are legal entities and can 
only act through the conduct of natural persons.
171
 A set of rules on attribution was developed by the 
International Law Commission (‘ILC’) in its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
international wrongful acts (‘Draft Articles’).172 The Draft Articles are not legally binding as such yet 
codify rules of customary international law.
173
 
In relation to acts of natural persons or groups of persons, we can distinguish between state 
responsibility for acts (a) of de jure state organs, (b) of de facto state organs, (c) of private persons and 
(d) directed or controlled by the State.
174
 Attributing the conduct of de jure and de facto state organs to 
the State is rather unproblematic: as Den Heijer outlines, it is the most basic rule of attribution and is 
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stipulated in Article 4 of Draft Articles.
175
 States are thus in principle only responsible for their own 
behaviour, as well as for the conduct of their subsidiary agents and institutions in the exercise of their 
respective official functions.
176
 This includes all entities that form part of the State organisation and act 
on its behalf.
177
 In this case, the DIBP staff employed at the Nauru RPC, the Australian Federal Police 
and the Australian Defence Force can be seen as Australian state agents and their behaviour in the 
exercise of their duty can thus be attributed to the Australian State.
178
 The RPC (Deputy) Operational 
Managers and the Nauru Police Force can be seen as state agents of the Nauruan State, to which their 
actions in the RPC as performed in their official capacities can be attributed.  
The conduct of private actors can also be attributed to the State in some instances (Article 5 Draft 
Articles). This is, however, not a presumptive norm.
179
 Private conduct can only be attributed to the State 
when the private actor is legally empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority and the 
particular act or omission is conducted in that governmental capacity.
180
 However, the accompanying 
tests are onerous and there are no internationally accepted definitions of 'governmental authority',
181
 
thereby leaving leeway to states to adopt their own tests.
182
  
In this case, it is difficult to assert indefinitely whether the private contractors act under the 
governmental authority of Nauru and/or Australia – this very much depends on the test applied to, and 
interpretation of, ‘governmental authority’. One option is to follow the US Supreme Court’s approach, 
which outlined that it suffices that a private actor fulfils a ‘public function’ that has ‘traditionally been 
the exclusive prerogative of the State’.183 Another is the approach of McCorquodale and Simons, who 
argue that governmental authority appears to include ‘a wide variety of public functions, from running 
prisons, health and education facilities, to private airline corporations having delegated immigration or 
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quarantine power and a corporation having a role in the identification of property to be expropriated by 
the state’.184 Crawford, the last ILC Special Rapporteur on the issue, has stated that an example of an 
entity falling under Article 5 is the outsourcing of prison guarding to private entities.
185
 These approaches 
however still raise the question which of the actors involved in the Nauru RPC do in fact serve such 
functions.
186
 Thus, for example, the service providers providing safety and garrison services may be 
considered as exercising a traditional core function of sovereignty, and as such governmental 
authority,
187
 but this is less obvious with, for example, service providers providing accommodation, 
welfare or construction services.  
A further question is whether the provider’s behaviour – when exercising governmental authority 
– should be attributed to Nauru or Australia. Processing formally happens under Nauruan law and the 
asylum seekers are in the RPC as Nauruan visa holders – yet Australia contracts and remunerates the 
primary contractors. This difficulty is intensified by the condition of Article 5 of the Draft Articles that 
for attribution to be applicable, the private entity must exercise a governmental authority that was 
delegated to it by law. It remains unclear whether privatization through a contractual agreement, as is the 
case with the Nauru RPC, fulfils this criterion and allows for attribution to the State.
188
  According to 
Weigelt and Märker, a mere contract is insufficient.
189
 Accordingly, attribution of the conduct of private 
actors is difficult for three reasons: (i) not all private contractors arguably exercise a ‘governmental 
authority’, (ii) those that do exercise such an authority do so according to a contractual arrangement, not 
a legal provision, and (iii) even if such contractual arrangements can be construed as legal provisions, it 
remains unclear whether they exercise governmental authority on behalf of Australia or Nauru. 
As laid down in Article 8 of the Draft Articles, conduct can also be attributed to the state when 
the conduct is directed or controlled by the State. In this case, ‘it is not the quality of being an ‘agent’ of 
the state which is decisive for establishing state responsibility, but the factual relationship between the 
state and the conduct complained of’.190 This thus concerns an incidental form of attribution of private 
conduct to the state: that is, when the individual or private actor is acting under the instructions or control 
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of the State.
191
 The extent of such instructions or control needed to invoke attribution has, however, not 
remained uncontested.
192
  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, has imposed a high threshold for 
attribution on the basis of State control in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua.
193
 It accepted that a State can be liable for violations committed by private actors 
outside the State’s territory if it can be proven that the State had ‘effective control’ over the non-State 
actor in relation to the alleged violations.
194
 This entails a strict test, yet a realistic one: a State cannot be 
expected to guarantee that private actors will refrain from violating human rights abroad when it has no 
effective control over them.
195
 Consequently, ‘it is hard to imagine circumstances where a state would 
exercise the level of control […] required by the ICJ in Nicaragua, over a corporate national except, 
perhaps, in rare cases with respect to wholly state-owned corporations’.196  
In the present case, neither Australia nor Nauru is exercising the required amount of control over 
the contractors – except for some of the smaller subcontractors which are fully owned by the Nauruan 
State, including Eigigu Holding Corporation.
197
 Australia has contracts with the primary service 
providers, yet there is no academic consensus on whether this means that any concrete breach of 
international human rights law can thus be attributed to Australia on the basis of effective control.
198
 The 
ICJ’s approach in Nicaragua seems to imply that it does not: it held that the control has to go beyond 
financial or material support and/or a situation of dependence and that it has to be proven in relation to 
each of the alleged human rights violations that the State directed or enforced their perpetration.
199
 
Attribution becomes even more difficult when subcontractors are in play because their involvement 
waters down the ‘real link’ between the State and the behaviour.200 There is for example no formal basis 
for the Australian Government to deal with Wilson Security as a subcontractor and hence no genuine 
control over their conduct.
201
  
Alternatively to State control, State instructions also suffice for attribution under Article 8 of the 
Draft Articles – yet the ILC has outlined that a State that provides a lawful instruction (to for example 
private contractors) ‘does not assume the risk that the instructions will be carried out in an internationally 
unlawful way’.202 Likewise, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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Yugoslavia maintained that in relation to acts of (non-militarily organized) private actors, the instructions 
need to be issued with regard to each particular alleged violation of human rights.
203
 Yet this is not the 
case in the Nauru RPC, where there is no conclusive evidence that the Australian or Nauruan 
Government issued instructions to private contractors that entail specific abuses of human rights. To the 
contrary, the Australian Government contractually requires service providers to comply with human 
rights norms.
204
 It is thus problematic to maintain that alleged human rights abuses of private actors can 
be attributed to Australia or Nauru on the basis of lawful instructions or generic service contracts. 
 
Joint responsibility of states 
Conduct constituting an alleged human rights abuse can also be attributed to multiple States at the same 
time (Article 47 Draft Articles). This can happen in three situations: (a) when a number of States have 
acted independently in relation to the same abuse and their actions can be attributed to them via the 
above outlined attribution rules, (b) when a State takes part in the abuses of another State (‘derived 
responsibility’) and (c) when multiple states genuinely act in concert and this joint act engages the 
responsibility of each of these States.
205
  
The former encounters the same attribution problems as outlined above. In relation to the latter, 
holding States involved in ‘the joint management of facilities for external processing of migrants’ 
responsible for joint conduct or conduct of a joint organ does not appear problematic: it is confirmed by 
the ILC and remains rather uncontested.
206
 What is problematic, however, is determining when acts and 
organs must be considered as ‘joint’: the logic of international State responsibility may imply that 
conduct and organs are only ‘joint’ ‘when the activity complained of was carried out in accordance with 
the instructions of all states involved and that all responsible states had it in their power to prevent the 
alleged misconduct’.207 It is very questionable whether this is the case in the Nauru RPC: with a myriad 
of actors cooperating, contesting and conflicting, it is difficult to discern what the involvement of the 
Australian and Nauruan authorities is in relation to specific conduct. Are acts of the deployed DIBP staff 
‘joint’ acts? Are those of the Operational Managers? Or those of the private contractors? As nodal 
governance theory informs us, all these actors pursue different goals, with different mentalities, 
resources, technologies and institutional structures. In doing so, human rights may be abused– yet the 
plethora of interaction going on in the governance network makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
observe whether the Australian and/or Nauruan State either instructed the specific rights-abusing 
behaviour or had the power to prevent it, and whether they did so individually, jointly or otherwise.  
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In relation to the concept of derived responsibility, it is stipulated in Chapter IV of the Draft 
Articles that a State involved in the wrongful acts or omissions of another State can be held responsible 
separately on account of its involvement. This differs from attribution of conduct to the State in that 
derived responsibility applies in exceptional situations where the State’s international responsibility is 
dependent upon, and derives from, another state’s conduct. In these instances, the State itself did not 
carry out a human rights abuse but was involved in the human rights abuse of another State. This 
includes situations (i) when a State assists another State in the commission of a human rights abuse 
(Article 16 Draft Articles), (ii) when a State controls and directs another State in committing a human 
rights abuse (Article 17 Draft Articles) and (iii) when a State exercises coercion vis-à-vis another State to 
commit a human rights abuse (Article 18 Draft Articles).
208
  
Option (i) is particularly interesting in the domain of migration control, as migration-receiving 
States (such as Australia) often provide all kinds of assistance to origin, transit or processing countries 
(such as Nauru).
209
 However, there is no academic consensus and little jurisprudence on derived 
responsibility on the basis of aid and assistance. Its customary law status is therefore disputed.
210
 In 
addition, a problematic aspect of derived responsibility on the basis of aid and/or assistance is that it 
requires the assistance-providing State to provide such assistance ‘with knowledge of the circumstances 
of the international wrongful act’, which has been interpreted by the ILC as not only containing a 
requirement of knowledge, but also one of intent. Thus, the aid and assistance must be provided with the 
goal of  enabling the commission of an international wrongful act.
211
  
In the present case, it will again depend on the concrete circumstances whether or not Australia 
and/or Nauru can be held responsible on the basis of derived responsibility. It requires, on the one hand, 
the attribution of human rights violating conduct to either Australia or Nauru and, on the other hand, 
proof that the other State provided assistance in the commission of that particular conduct with both 
knowledge and intent. On first sight, it thus provides a workable solution for nodal settings: not one, but 
multiple States can be held accountable for human rights violating conduct, even if not all of these States 
carried out the conduct themselves or had the power to instruct or prevent it. On second thought, 
however, nodal governance difficulties persist: derived responsibility requires that the violating conduct 
can be attributed to at least one State, after which other States can also be implicated for their assistance. 
Even when it is clear that abuses result from particular conduct of one of the private contractors – which 
in practice provide the services with the largest potential of abusing rights –212 the subsequent attribution 
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of that conduct to a State remains difficult for the reasons set out above, continuing to obstruct effective 
attribution also in the case of derived responsibility. In addition, establishing intent on behalf of the 
aiding State to facilitate the occurrence of human rights abuses remains difficult in practice.
213
  
 
Positive obligations 
The concept of positive obligations has slowly but progressively been introduced in international human 
rights law, largely through decisions of international courts.
214
 It entails that national authorities have to 
adopt reasonable and suitable measures to safeguard human rights, either of a judicial nature (such as the 
provision of sanctions for individuals infringing a right) or of a practical nature (such as the provision of 
measures to protect an individual within its jurisdiction from the potentially harmful activities of other 
actors).
215
 Positive obligations of the state comprise both substantive obligations, requiring that basic 
measures are taken to ensure the full enjoyment of rights, and procedural obligations, requiring the 
provision of proper remedies in cases of rights abuses.
216
  
Whilst not constituting a rule of attribution, positive obligations provide an alternative way of 
establishing State responsibility for human rights abuses. Even when particular conduct cannot be 
attributed to the State, the State can still have acted in breach of its own positive obligation under 
international human rights law. This includes the responsibility to protect individuals from a horizontal 
human rights violation –  that is, an abuse of human rights by for example one of the private contractors. 
As states are ‘neither omniscient nor omnipotent’, positive obligations are however not absolute but 
require a State to exercise due diligence by adopting the required measures reasonably within their power 
to achieve the protection of individuals.
217
 This closely aligns to the anchored pluralism concept: the 
State should provide ‘anchoring points’ in the nodal field and actively monitor the behaviour of the 
various parties involved.
218
   
In case of an alleged human rights abuse, it should thus first be established that Nauru and/or 
Australia has jurisdiction (which, as outlined above, is presumed to exist for Nauru but is more uncertain 
and requires a factual assessment in relation to Australia which is difficult to perform). Second, it must 
be proven that Nauru and/or Australia did not adopt the required measures reasonably within their power 
(a) to prevent the abuse from occurring or (b) to provide procedural redress.  
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In relation to (a), although it remains difficult to see what happens in practice, the Australian and 
Nauruan Government seem to have taken such measures by implementing a number of regulatory 
provisions and monitoring mechanisms to prevent human rights abuses of private actors from occurring. 
This includes contractual stipulations, formal and informal communications, incident management 
arrangements and management protocols, daily and weekly meetings, minimum standards for service 
providers, codes of conduct, joint committees and working groups, deployment of Operational Managers 
with monitoring tasks, internal and external reviews,
219
 and the involvement of the Nauru Police Force 
and the Australian Federal Police. In addition, further monitoring and supervisory bodies were created by 
the DIBP in 2014-2015. The Detention Assurance Team is supposed to strengthen assurance and 
integrity in managing detention services, the Child Protection Panel provides advice on child protection 
in immigration detention, a Regional Processing and Settlement Branch is responsible for the 
coordination and management of all regional processing, settlement and returns operations, and the 
position of ‘ABF Attaché South Pacific’ was established within the DIBP to provide a link between the 
DIBP and all international partners in the South Pacific, including Nauru.
220
 In case of a human rights 
abuse, these mechanisms need to be evaluated to assess whether they satisfied the positive obligation of 
Nauru and/or Australia to exercise the required level of due diligence.  
In relation to (b), whether sufficient redress is provided likewise depends on the specific rights 
violation and the procedural mechanisms made available by the involved States. In some cases, the 
violation will constitute a criminal offence after which police investigations and potentially criminal 
prosecutions will be commenced. In other cases, investigations by for example the service provider or the 
DIBP may be sufficient to provide proper redress. Still in other cases, grave violations may necessitate 
the existence of an impartial judicial or non-judicial complaint mechanism which can easily be accessed 
by potential victims. Under some circumstances, the absence of adequate redress mechanisms thus could 
be an avenue to hold Nauru and/or Australia responsible.  
The obligation to provide sufficient procedural redress is, however, somewhat paradoxical. States 
violate their positive obligations if they do not provide sufficient procedural redress – including access to 
justice – to a victim of a human rights abuse, yet if no access to justice is provided and no procedural 
redress mechanisms are in place, it is difficult or even impossible for victims to have such positive 
obligations enforced. Put simply, without a remedy being available, the violation of a right to a remedy is 
difficult to enforce in practice. Here, there is thus an inherent tension between de jure responsibility and 
de facto enforceability – which brings us to the second step of proper legal human rights protection: that 
of accountability. 
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B. Accountability 
In light of the foregoing, it is extremely difficult to definitely establish and delineate de jure human 
rights responsibilities in the Australian-Nauruan offshore RPC arrangements. International human rights 
law is only triggered when abuses happen within the jurisdiction of a State and can be attributed to that 
State, yet the nodal set-up of the processing arrangements, including the developments of offshoring and 
privatisation, increasingly challenges the accuracy and effectiveness of these fundamental prerequisites. 
Demarcating legal international human rights responsibilities in these situations indeed becomes 
increasingly difficult because the factual arrangements and power structures constantly change in an 
ever-reconfiguring nodal field, distancing the State from abuses through the involvement of additional 
public and private actors. The on-going trend towards nodal governance consequently provides States 
with opportunities to explore the legal margins of human rights law and manoeuvre themselves outside 
of its reach, both in relation to negative and positive obligations. 
In concrete cases, establishing human rights responsibility could however still be possible. 
Indeed, some cases entail clear-cut breaches of human rights that fall within the jurisdiction of, and are 
attributable to, Australia and/or Nauru – one could, for example, think about potential misconduct by the 
Australian Federal Police or the Nauruan Police Force resulting in a human rights abuse. In such cases, 
human rights law appears to provide a spark of optimism in relation to a victim’s protection – yet such 
optimism fades when considering the level of accountability on which de jure responsibilities ought to be 
transformed into de facto safeguards. Illustrated by two examples, this section argues that the setting in 
which the RPC is situated, as well as its nodal structure, raise a number of accountability issues which 
inhibit the proper legal protection of human rights even when responsibility can be clearly demarcated. 
 First, there is no regional human rights court in the Australian-Pacific region, nor any 
international monitoring body that can issue binding judgments. Human rights consequently have a 
‘precarious foothold’ in Australia’s legal system.221 Australia is a signatory to various international 
human rights treaties, yet it remains the only democratic country in the world without a national bill of 
rights.
222
 Whilst most European, American and African countries are supervised by regional courts, a 
similar structure is absent in the Oceanian region. There is moreover almost no initiative based on a clear 
roadmap to achieve such regional protection in the Australian-Pacific region.
223
 Although Australia and 
Nauru are monitored by international monitoring bodies such as the HRC and the UN Committee 
Against Torture, these bodies issue non-binding views and comments only and cannot consider real 
penalties for non-compliance.
224
 Their rulings are consequently, as Peers and Roman put it, thrown ‘on 
                                                          
221
 Byrnes, Charlesworth and McKinnon, Bills of Rights in Australia: History, Politics and Law (2009) at xv. 
222
 Ibid. 
223
 European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, The Role of Regional Human 
Rights Mechanisms, EXPO/B/DROI/2009/25, November 2010 at 13, available at:  
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/410206/EXPO-DROI_ET(2010)410206_EN.pdf [last 
accessed 9 February 2016]. 
224
 Hathaway, supra n 6 at 2023; Klein, supra n 24 at 441; Posner, supra n 7. 
34 
 
the barbeque’ by politicians.225 The Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’) likewise monitors 
Australia’s human rights obligations but has no enforcement power and cannot make binding 
recommendations.
226
 The Australian Government has moreover blocked the AHRC’s request to visit the 
Nauru RPC for investigative purposes as its jurisdiction does not extend beyond Australia’s sovereign 
borders.
227
 Consequently, monitoring how Australia and Nauru deal with their international legal human 
rights obligations in practice is limited and does not produce binding results: de jure rights therefore 
hardly materialize as de facto safeguards and are consequently compromised.
228
 Conversely, Australian 
national courts which do deliver binding judgments often cannot and/or do not take (international) 
human rights obligations into account. This is aptly illustrated by a recent High Court case, in which a 
challenge to the legality of the Australian-Nauruan offshore processing arrangements brought by lawyers 
on behalf of a Bangladeshi woman was rejected on the basis of the Australian Constitution (which does 
not contain a bill of rights) and national law.
229
 Human rights obligations were not mentioned in the 
judgment and thus largely remain international figments in a nationally-oriented juridical system. This 
distinguishes the Australian-Pacific region from other parts of the world where human rights law, be it to 
varying extents, finds application through national bills of rights and regional supervisory courts.  
Second, as has also been mentioned above, the Nauru RPC is characterized by limited 
transparency and openness. This is on the one hand due to the walls of governance that are erected: many 
of the bilateral and contractual arrangements between the various public and private actors involved 
remain secret and the corporate actors involved act without much public scrutiny.
230
 On the other hand, 
the lack of transparency and openness is enhanced by the physical and procedural remoteness of the 
centre.
231
 A variety of observers are indeed unable to visit the RPC, either because they are denied 
permission to enter the RPC or because they are denied a visa to Nauru. Visas were, for example, denied 
to a UN Working Group on Human Rights,
232
 Amnesty International and other human rights 
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organisations,
233
 human rights advocates,
234
 and researchers.
235
 Nauru has furthermore raised the non-
refundable visa application fees for journalists in January 2014 with 4000%, from AUD$200 to 
AUD$8000.
236
 In addition, Nauru has a limited media scene and freedom of press.
237
 It is thus 
simultaneously ‘difficult to look into and to look out of’ the RPC.238 Information only comes out 
incidentally through whistle-blowers and leaked reports that were never meant for publication.
239
 It is 
therefore difficult to see whether human rights abuses occur and which actors contribute to potential 
abuses – a problem which has been labelled as one of ‘many hands’.240 This lack of transparency and 
comprehensibility of the nodal governance system makes it difficult not only to assert legal responsibility 
(as it inhibits an assessment of the factual power arrangements and allows the various involved actors to 
refer to one another as the relevant responsible actor, as outlined above), but also to hold States 
accountable in practice (as abuses remain covert and do not surface).
241
 It is as such difficult for the 
inside world to speak out and for the outside world to either witness or hear about concrete human rights 
abuses and to subsequently step in to hold actors accountable, no matter how clear that actor’s 
responsibility is on the legal plane.  
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Remarkably, after its contract at the RPC ended, Save the Children Australia explicitly called 
upon the Australian Government to increase transparency at the RPC and to introduce mandatory 
reporting by all of the service providers on human rights.
242
 The problematic lack of transparency and 
openness is thus not only ascertained by external commentators, but also explicitly acknowledged by a 
former actor in the field. 
   
5. CONCLUSION: HUMAN RIGHTS AS LOST CAUSE? 
Whereas some consider the concept of human rights as a conundrum with internationalist allure, others 
consider it to be a panacea for governance accountability. When international human rights law gained 
momentum, the focus was very much on the latter: curtailing the public powers of sovereign States as the 
prime (and arguably sole) duty bearers.
243
 In contemporary reality, however, sovereign territorial States 
have long ceased to be – or, on a different reading, never in fact were – the primary actors with a 
significant impact on human rights entitlements. Processes of privatisation and extra-territorialisation 
nowadays cross and bridge the borders between sovereign territories and between the public and private 
spheres, thereby diffusing the State’s role as main governance actor. The Nauru RPC provides an 
accurate example of both developments, combining the extraterritorialisation and privatisation of 
immigration control in the Australian-Pacific realm.  
 This article has questioned whether international human rights law continues to constitute a 
proper framework of legal responsibility and accountability in such cases – especially as it is often relied 
upon in pressuring Australia,
244
 Nauru
245
 and the involved private contractors.
246
 On the level of 
responsibility, both jurisdiction and attribution constitute significant obstacles. Private contractors do not 
carry human rights duties as of yet and can thus not be held responsible under international human rights 
law. The jurisdiction of Nauru is presumed on the basis of territoriality, whilst establishing Australia’s 
jurisdiction requires the effective control over territory and/or persons – which, in turn, depends on a 
difficult-to-perform assessment of the constantly changing factual arrangements and power structures. In 
relation to attribution, the conduct of de jure or de facto state actors can be attributed to the respective 
State, but in this case, most human rights-sensible conduct is exercised by private contractors.
247
 For both 
the attribution of their conduct to either Australia or Nauru and the determination of derived 
responsibility, one of the various attribution tests needs to be fulfilled, which is however likewise 
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problematic because of the constantly changing factual governance arrangements. This is not different in 
relation to positive obligations: to establish responsibility on this basis, the factual arrangements and 
systems in place are decisive yet significantly opaque. 
For establishing international human rights responsibility, the biggest problem is therefore not 
the mere reality that additional States and private actors are involved. Rather, it is the fact that in such 
cases, the avenues to address responsibility under international human rights law require a factual 
assessment of effective control (and thus of the way in which the RPC is governed). Nodal governance 
theory shows, however, that power and control are everywhere, not with a particular actor – at least not 
at all times. This inhibits distilling effective control on behalf of a specific actor. 
Transfield/Broadspectrum has for example taken over the responsibilities of other private contractors in 
providing a number of services and is consequently potentially exercising a more dominant power and a 
larger extent of control than before. Likewise, Nauru has increasingly taken over responsibilities from 
the Australian government over the past years, including in relation to managing the centres at an 
operational level
248
 and in relation to the processing of asylum claims.
249
 Also, Nauru increasingly 
acknowledges its own active and leading role in requesting Australia to provide services and support.
250
 
The Nauruan Government even issued a media release in relation to its asylum processing with the title 
‘Nauru is not Australia’, in which it emphasised its position in the RPC arrangements through ‘a simple 
message - remember that Nauru is not a state of Australia!’251 As such, Nauru’s role in governing the 
RPC has arguably become more prominent and leading – although the question remains whether these 
transfers of responsibilities are genuine or amount to mere window-dressing. The Australian High Court 
has recently answered this question in the negative: transferred asylum seekers should, in the Court’s 
opinion, be regarded as ‘detained in custody under the laws of Nauru’252 and subjected to ‘the 
independent exercise of sovereign legislative and executive power by Nauru’.253 It also found that there 
was no joint governmental authority being exercised: only the Nauruan government exercises authority at 
the RPC.
254
  
In the end, it remains unclear how exactly the mix of various mentalities, technologies, resources, 
institutional structures and goals of the plethora of actors plays out in practice and who, thus, potentially 
controls whom or what at which stage. This article has hence explicitly not argued that it is impossible to 
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determine human rights responsibility, but rather that it can continuously change and is difficult to 
establish given the fluctuating and hybrid arrangements and power structures. As a result, the rules of 
international human rights law allow a certain leeway to States to dispute and ignore responsibility both 
in general and in concrete cases. As Gammeltoft-Hansen points out, ‘assessing what may reasonably be 
expected from a state is open to contestation and States have been keen to argue that they were either 
unknowing or incapable of taking action to prevent human rights abuses’.255 This leads to the danger that  
 
the State that has chosen to privatize will argue that it is not responsible for the decisions or 
conduct of privatized actors, since it no longer exercises those activities, while the latter could 
argue that they are not responsible since they are just private actors and the State is the one 
which should be held accountable.
256
  
 
Both Australia and Nauru have in fact denied responsibility.
257
 That is the reality, and arguably the 
weakness, of international human rights law in a nodal setting. As Kennedy puts it in the context of 
privatisation, if we do not come to terms with this reality, ‘we will find ourselves dealing with 
Nineteenth century animals in a twenty-first century legal zoo’.258  
Yet even if these problems can be overcome, human rights monitoring in the Australian-Pacific 
context remains weak and does not produce binding judgments or penalties. In addition, many human 
rights abuses remain hidden because of the nodal field’s limited transparency and openness, which beats 
even the most absolute norm and the clearest legal responsibility. Establishing de jure responsibility is 
thus extremely difficult, but even if one succeeds, accountability is not effectuated with sufficient force 
de facto because many abuses remain undetected whilst those detected generally are not enforced 
through binding sanctions. This is detrimental to the legal protection of human rights, as treaty provisions 
remain paper tigers without proper enforcement of sanctions in cases of non-compliance.
259
 No matter 
the noble promises of internationally codified human rights – in the end of the day, you cannot eat 
them
260
 nor use them as physical shields against abuse or maltreatment. Human rights violations 
accordingly ‘all too often seem to make a mockery of the proliferation of procedures, committees and 
commissions on human rights’.261 
The conclusion is hence a rather pessimistic one: international human rights law’s value as legal 
protection mechanism in the context of the Nauru RPC is limited at best, seriously flawed at worst. The 
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system of human rights is based on faith
262
 and hope
263
 – yet in this context, such faith and hope 
materialize insufficiently on the legal plane.  
At this point, two suggestions are in place. First, as explored in the literature on ‘crimmigration’, 
immigration control increasingly merges with crime control instruments, rationales and structures.
264
 
Immigration detention facilities thus increasingly shows resemblance to prisons as they both functioning 
as exclusionary detention facilities for marginalised communities and perceived security threats, not only 
in Australia but also elsewhere.
265
 Whilst such a development is often criticized, it may also provide a 
pathway to re-conceptualize asylum seeker protection. Indeed, in a variety of jurisdictions, criminal 
procedural law generally provides those detained with more protection than administrative immigration 
law, including access to a lawyer and to courts.
266
 Maybe – and this is, if anything, a hypothetical 
position – one should thus on the basis of the crimmigration development divert attention from 
international human rights law as a legal framework of accountability towards the particularities of the 
different branches of law under which people are detained. Wilsher already seems ahead of this debate: 
he argues that immigration detention should be tied more closely to criminal law, and states that ‘in this 
important sense immigration detention has not been criminalized enough’.267 
Second, does the foregoing mean that human rights have reached their limits and are largely 
redundant in nodal settings? No, not necessarily. Whilst human rights are codified in international law, 
they are not necessarily a mere legal concept but can also have a beneficial influence and effect outside 
the legal realm. It can well be imagined, for example, that human rights play a crucial role in the 
discourse
268
 and interaction between the various nodal actors, not necessarily because these actors may 
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be held accountable for them under international law but because the language of human rights carries 
significant symbolic power and rights-respecting behaviour may be considered a condition or advantage 
when awarding a (sub)contract to a private actor.
269
 The contrary can also be imagined: rights can be 
used as argument or frame of reference to explain away injustices and moral wrongs: the minimum 
standards of human rights can, as such, discursively be reframed as the maximum standard of protection 
owed.
270
 Whilst beyond the scope of the present article, these potential extra-legal functions need to be 
empirically examined to further assess the actual value and impact of the human rights concept in a 
concrete context. In particular in nodal settings, such additional roles may constitute a cause for more 
overall optimism or further pessimism about the actual merit of human rights.
271
 With nodal detention 
increasingly being utilized, the time has indeed come to combine the legal with the empirical plane in 
order to draw conclusions on whether human rights constitute a durable normative, conceptual and 
practical framework to provide detained individuals with adequate protection in the long run. 
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